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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Val Leppert"
and Stephen A. McCullers**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's 2014
term featured several interesting opinions addressing the admissibility
of evidence.' For example, the court tackled two issues of first impression analyzing constitutional rights against the admission of evidence.
In one case, the Eleventh Circuit decided whether the Confrontation
Clause applies to evidence used by a district court in determining
jurisdiction over the offense in a pretrial hearing. In another case, the
court developed a rule to determine when an adverse inference jury
instruction is warranted after a nonparty invokes its Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent in a civil case.
The Eleventh Circuit also issued several noteworthy opinions
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. In one decision, the
court reversed the lower court's Daubert ruling after cautioning that
federal courts cannot defer to the recommendations of industry groups
when determining the admissibility of expert evidence. In two equally
interesting cases, the court affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony
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where the plaintiffs expert failed to adequately explain his methodology
or to employ the methodology he allegedly relied upon.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit published two notable opinions addressing a common evidentiary issue: the balancing of relevance and undue
prejudice under Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
One decision discussed the admissibility of alternative causation
evidence in a wrongful death case, and the other considered whether a
plaintiff in a hostile work environment suit can use evidence of racial
harassment against his co-workers that was not directly connected to the
plaintiff's supervisor.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES

A. Addressing the Limits and Application of the Confrontation
Clause
In criminal prosecutions, the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution 2 guarantees the accused's
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."3 The Confrontation Clause therefore bars the admission of "[tiestimonial statements
of witnesses absent from trial," unless "the declarant is unavailable" and
the defendant "had a prior opportunity to cross-examine" the declarant.4
In the 2014 term, the Eleventh Circuit published two opinions further
defining the scope of the Confrontation Clause.
In United States v. Mathis,' the court held that text messages from
the victim of a child molester were not testimonial and therefore did not
implicate the Confrontation Clause.6 A jury convicted Mathis of several
child exploitation offenses after receiving, among other things, evidence
of text messages a victim sent to Mathis's smartphone. Because the
victim did not testify at trial, Mathis argued that the admission of the
text messages violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.7
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.' The victim's text messages were not
testimonial, and thus not subject to the Confrontation Clause because
they "were not formal statements to government officers, they were not

2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Id.
4. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
5. 767 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014).
6. Id. at 1278-79.
7. Id. at 1268, 1272-73, 1278-79. The district court admitted the text messages but, in
recognizing them as hearsay, instructed the jury that it could not consider the victim's
messages for the truth of the matters asserted. Id. at 1272.
8. Id. at 1278-79.
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made during a custodial examination, and they did not constitute an
affidavit, prior testimony, or pretrial statements that [the victim] would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." Instead, the victim's text
messages "were informal, haphazard communications sent at all hours
and from locations such as his house, the bus stop, and his school"--not
the type of "circumstances that would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that they would be available for use at a later
trial.""° Accordingly, the text messages were not testimonial and did
not implicate the Confrontation Clause."
In United States v. Campbell, 2 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether the Confrontation Clause applies to a certification used by the
district court in a pretrial determination of whether it has jurisdiction
over a case.'3 A grand jury indicted the defendant under the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act 4 after law enforcement arrested him on a
flagless vessel transporting drugs in international waters. 5 This
statute subjects "'a vessel without nationality"' to the jurisdiction of the
United States.1 6 It defines such a stateless vessel as, among other
things, "'a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes
a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not
affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.'" 7 The master of Campbell's vessel claimed that it was registered
in Haiti; however, when the Coast Guard inquired, the Haitian
government could neither confirm nor deny the registry of the vessel."i
At a pretrial hearing to determine whether the district court had
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the vessel, the government introduced
into evidence a certification of the Secretary of State that included a
statement of a Coast Guard commander that, upon his inquiry, the
Republic of Haiti could neither confirm nor deny the registry of the
vessel. Campbell objected on the ground that the admission of the
certification violated his right under the Confrontation Clause. The
district court overruled Campbell's objection and concluded that the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id.
743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 809.
46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-08 (2012).
743 F.3d at 804.
Id. at 806 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A)).
Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 70502(dX1XC)).
Id. at 804.
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certification sufficiently established extraterritorial jurisdiction over
Campbell's vessel.19
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the certification was not
subject to the Confrontation Clause.2" According to the court, "[t]he
Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of hearsay to make a
pretrial determination of jurisdiction when that hearsay does not pertain
to an element of the offense." 2' And "[blecause the stateless nature of
Campbell's vessel was not an element of his offense to be proved at trial,
the admission of the certification did not violate his right to confront the
witnesses against him."22
In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the United
States Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence focused on
facts to be proven at trial; indeed, the Supreme Court "has never
extended the reach of the Confrontation Clause beyond the confines of
a trial."2 3 In other words, "[tihe Confrontation Clause protects a
defendant's trial right to confront testimony offered against him to
establish his guilt-it does not limit the use of evidence to establish
jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act at a pretrial
hearing.24 The Eleventh Circuit found further support for its holding
in case law from other circuits similarly refusing to extend the Confrontation Clause to "pre- and post-trial proceedings that do not concern the
adjudication of a defendant's guilt or innocence." 25 But, the Eleventh
Circuit preserved the issue of whether pre- and post-trial proceedings
that touch on the guilt or innocence of the accused could implicate the
Confrontation Clause.' The court specifically cautioned that it did "not
decide whether the Confrontation Clause could ever apply to a pretrial
determination."" The court "conclude[d] only that it does not apply to
this pretrial determination of jurisdiction where the certification does
not implicate either the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with
an offense under the [Maritime Drug Law Enforcement] Act."'

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 804-05.
at 806-09.
at 806.
at 806-07.
at 808.
at 808-09.
at 809.
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B. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that "[n] o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
To protect a defendant's right to
be a witness against himself."'
remain silent and "to minimize the danger that the jury will give
evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify," a trial judge "has
the constitutional obligation, upon proper request," to give a no-adverseinference instruction to the jury during the guilt phase of trial. ° In
White v. Woodall,3" the United States Supreme Court considered
whether it was objectively unreasonable for a court to refuse such an
instruction during the penalty phase.32
The defendant in White pleaded guilty to capital murder, capital
kidnapping, and first-degree rape. During the penalty phase of trial, the
defendant exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify.33
Counsel for the defendant asked the trial judge for a blanket no-adverseinference instruction to inform the jury that "'[a] defendant is not
compelled to testify and the fact that the defendant did not testify
should not prejudice him in any way."'' The trial judge denied this
request. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
and found that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth
Amendment does not require a blanket no-adverse-inference instruction
during the penalty phase of trial.3"
Following the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision, the defendant filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The federal
district court held that the state court's refusal to issue the requested
no-adverse-inference instruction violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Sixth Circuit Court of

29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
30.
31.
32.

Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981).
134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014).
Id. at 1701-02.

33. Id. at 1701. The Court noted that the evidence against the defendant was
"overwhelming" and included the defendant's fingerprints on the victim's car, blood
consistent with the blood of the victim on the defendant's clothing, and the defendant's
DNA on the victim. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Appellate Record at 31, White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697 (2014) (No.
12-794)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).

35. Id. at 1701, 1704. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a
writ of certiorari challenging the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Woodall v.
Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 104, 115 (Ky. 2002), on direct appeal. WoodaU v. Kentucky, 537
U.S. 835 (2002).

970
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Appeals affirmed, ordering the Commonwealth of Kentucky to resentence
the defendant or release him. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.36
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stressed that under the federal
habeas statute, a federal court shall grant a habeas petition only if the
decision of the state court "'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States."'3 7 This standard is "difficult to
meet" 8 and requires "an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement."39
Furthermore, "state courts enjoy 'broad discretion' in their adjudication
of a prisoner's claims" where the "'precise contours'" of the defendant's
Constitutional rights remain unclear.4 ° Thus, it was not the Court's
duty in the first instance to decide whether a no-adverse-inference
instruction was required in the case.4 1 Rather, it was to determine,
based on prior Supreme Court precedent, whether the trial court's
refusal to give the requested instruction was objectively reasonable.4 2
It was under this much more lenient standard that the Court considered
the habeas petition. 43
Reviewing its Fifth Amendment precedent, the Court held that
although the privilege against self-incrimination does generally apply
during the penalty phase, none of the Court's prior opinions held that a
defendant was entitled to a blanket no-adverse-inference instruction.44
While it was clear that a defendant's silence during the penalty phase
cannot be used to draw adverse inferences regarding the facts of the
crime, prior precedent suggested that some inferences-such as45a lack of
remorse-may be drawn from a defendant's refusal to testify.

Here, because the defendant pleaded guilty to all charges, there was
no danger of the jury drawing adverse inferences from the defendant's

36. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1701-02.
37. Id. at 1702 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012)).
38. Id. (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
39. Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
40. Id. at 1705 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003)).
41. Id. at 1703.
42. Id. at 1704.
43. Id. at 1702.
44. Id. at 1702-03; see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328-29 (1999)
(prohibiting the drawing of adverse inferences during the penalty phase regarding the facts
of the crime); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463-66 (1981) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was implicated where the state offered an
involuntary, court-ordered competency examination during the penalty phase).
45. White, 134 S.Ct. at 1704, 1705.
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silence regarding the facts of the crime.46 Thus, "any inferences that
could have been drawn from [the defendant's] silence would arguably fall
within the class of inferences" allowed by existing case law.4 The trial
court's refusal to issue the no-adverse-inference instruction, therefore,
was objectively reasonable." Consequently, the Court held that the
Sixth Circuit erred in granting the defendant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and remanded the case.49
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not
limited to criminal cases, but also may be invoked during civil litigation.5 ° While a party to civil litigation has the right to remain silent,
"the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties
to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative
evidence offered against them."' This protects the civil litigant's right
against self-incrimination while still allowing the civil case to proceed. 2
This year, the Eleventh Circuit addressed an unusual question of first
impression: whether a nonparty's invocation of the Fifth Amendment in
civil litigation could be used to draw a negative inference against a
party.53
In Coquina Investments v. TD Bank, N.A. ,4an investment partnership sued a bank for its involvement in a billion-dollar Ponzi scheme.
The Ponzi scheme architect was a south Florida attorney who purported
to represent whistleblowers and sexual harassment victims who had
settled their claims for large structured settlements of periodic payments. The attorney claimed that the plaintiffs wanted immediate
payment and sought wealthy investors willing to pay the plaintiffs a
fraction of the total value of the settlement in exchange for receiving the

46. Id. at 1704.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1707. Justice Breyer penned the three-member dissent. See id. Relying on
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. at 305, for the proposition that a trial judge has a
constitutional duty to give a requested no-adverse-inference instruction, and on Estelle, 451
U.S. at 462-63, for the proposition that there is "'no basis to distinguish between the guilt
and penalty phases'" of a capital murder trial, the dissenting Justices argued that it was
"clear" the Fifth Amendment required a no-adverse-inference instruction when requested
during the penalty phase of a trial. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1707-08.
50. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1975) ("[Ihe privilege against selfincrimination can be asserted 'in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.'" (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
444 (1972))).
51. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
52. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 328.
53. Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2014).
54. 760 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2014).
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remaining settlement payments. Unbeknownst to the investors, neither
the plaintiffs nor their large settlements actually existed. Rather, the
attorney had created a Ponzi scheme, using money provided by new
investors to pay older investors high "returns" on their initial investment
and to finance his own lavish lifestyle.55
To entice investors, the attorney claimed that the full settlement was
already deposited in a trust account that contained transfer restrictions,
thereby protecting the investors' returns. The attorney further provided
letters signed by the bank's regional vice president as proof of the
transfer limitations.
An investment partnership from Texas was
interested, and the attorney provided the partnership with these letters
from the bank's vice president. The vice president himself also assured
the partnership directly that the restrictions were effective and
commonly used at the bank. This, however, was a lie. The attorney
routinely transferred funds from the trust account to himself. Furthermore, the vice president wrongfully claimed that there were millions of
dollars in the settlement account, when the account barely held $100.
The investment partnership invested $37.7 million into the Ponzi
scheme, and when the scheme collapsed, they lost $6.7 million.56
The partnership sued the bank alleging that it aided and abetted the
attorney's Ponzi scheme and made fraudulent misrepresentations. At
trial, the court allowed the vice president to be called to testify, even
though he had decided to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The court then told the jury it could draw inferences
against the bank-a party-based on the silence of the vice president-a
nonparty witness. The jury found for the investment partnership on
both claims and awarded $32 million in compensatory damages and $35
million in punitive damages.5"
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the bank argued that the trial
court erred in allowing the investment partnership to call the vice
president as a witness for the sole purpose of pleading the Fifth
Amendment in the jury's presence. The bank also claimed that the court
erred by allowing the jury to make adverse inferences against the bank
based on the vice president's refusal to answer questions.58
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that neither it nor
the United States Supreme Court had previously considered the issue.59
Relying heavily on the Second Circuit decision in LiButti v. United

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1304-05.
at 1305.
at 1306-07.
at 1309.
at 1310.
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States,"0 the Eleventh Circuit found that the "overarching concern" in
determining whether to admit a nonparty's invocation of the Fifth
Amendment is "whether the adverse inference is trustworthy under all
of the circumstances and will advance the search for the truth." In
making this determination, the court adopted the non-exclusive, fourfactor test from LiButti: "(1) the nature of the relevant relationships; (2)
the degree of control of the party over the non-party witness; (3) the
compatibility of the interests of the party and non-party witness in the
litigation; and (4) the role of the non-party witness in the
outcome of6 the
2
litigation."

Applying these factors to the case before it, the court found that three
of the factors supported allowing the jury to draw adverse inferences
First, alagainst the bank based on the vice president's silence.'
though the vice president was no longer employed by the bank, there
was reason to believe that he was still loyal to the bank, especially since
the bank was paying his legal fees. 64

Second, his invocation of the

Fifth Amendment likely furthered both his and the bank's legal
interests.65 Finally, he had a large role in the litigation considering
that his alleged actions and misrepresentations formed a significant part
of the investment partnership's complaint.66 Thus, any adverse
inferences drawn against the bank based on the vice president's silence
were "trustworthy."67 Accordingly, the circuit court held that the
district court erred neither in allowing the investment partnership to
call the vice president to the stand for him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury nor in
granting the investment partnership's request for an adverse inference
against the bank based on the vice president's silence.68
III.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

Federal Rule of Evidence 70269 governs the admissibility of expert
opinion testimony in federal court. The rule provides that "[a] witness
who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
60. 107 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
61. Coquina Invs., 760 F.3d at 1311 (quoting LiButti, 107 F.3d at 124) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. (quoting LiButti, 107 F.3d at 123-24) (internal quotation marks omitted).

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1312.

68. Id.
69. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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or education may testify in the form of an opinion" if four conditions are
satisfied:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c)the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.70
Applying Rule 702 and the Supreme Court's seminal opinion in
7
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the Eleventh Circuit
has distilled three requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) "the expert must be qualified to testify competently regarding the
matter he or she intends to address"; (2) the expert's "methodology...
must be reliable as determined by a Daubert inquiry"; and (3) the
expert's "testimony must assist the trier of fact through the application
72
of expertise to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue."
The Eleventh Circuit's 2014 term included published opinions on each
of these three prongs.
The Expert Must Be Qualified to Testify

A.

In Lebron v. Secretary of Florida Department of Children & Families,7 3 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion that
an expert for the State of Florida was not qualified to render an opinion
on drug use among applicants for the State's Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program.7" Plaintiff Lebron brought a classaction lawsuit challenging a Florida statute that required him to submit
to suspicionless drug testing as a condition of eligibility for TANF
Lebron contended that the statute violated his Fourth
benefits.
75
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
The State attempted to defend the constitutionality of the statute
under the "special need" exception to the Fourth Amendment's general
76
To that end, the State
prohibition against suspicionless searches.
sought to present the expert testimony of Dr. Avram Mack, "a practicing
psychiatrist and professor of clinical psychiatry at Georgetown Universi-

Id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kilpatrick v. Breg Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010).
772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1368-69.
Id. at 1357-58.
76. Id. at 1360-61; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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ty School of Medicine." 77 Dr. Mack opined that "drug use among TANF
applicants and recipients is greater than among the general population." 8 More specifically, Dr. Mack explained that "within the TANF
population at least five percent of adults had a drug use disorder
(compared with two percent in the general population) and twenty
percent had used drugs within the past year (against approximately five
percent of the general population)."79 The district court excluded Dr.
Mack's testimony because "he was not sufficiently qualified by background, training, or expertise to offer the opinions he presented."
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that "the district court did not
abuse its discretion in deciding that Dr. Mack was not an expert in the
relevant field."8" Explaining that "[elxpertise in one field does not
qualify a witness to testify about others," the Eleventh Circuit observed
that "Dr. Mack has a background in clinical psychiatry and the
treatment of drug abuse, not social science or statistics." 2 While "the
crux of Dr. Mack's testimony was a claim about the rates of drug use
among the TANF population," there was "precious little to suggest he
was qualified 'by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' to
testify about" this subject.8 3 As a clinical psychiatrist, Dr. Mack had
no "background in studying the rates of drug use in any demographic
group.'
The Eleventh Circuit further noted that "Dr. Mack did not propos[e]
to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research
'
Instead, he
[he had] conducted independent of the litigation."8
"developed [his] opinions expressly for purposes of testifying" in "an area
that he did not otherwise specialize." 6 What is more, Dr. Mack had
"no prior experience with or knowledge of drug use among Florida's
TANF population," nor did he "examine[] Lebron or any member of the
putative class."8 7 As such, "the district court acted well within its
discretion... when it determined that Dr. Mack was not qualified by

77. Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1368.

78. Id.
79.

Id.

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1368-69.
at 1369 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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background, training, or expertise to opine about the degree of drug use
in Florida's TANF population.* 8
B.

The Expert's Opinions Must be Based on a Reliable Methodology

The Eleventh Circuit published several interesting opinions addressing
the methodology prong of the Daubert analysis. The most noteworthy
decision was Adams v. Laboratory Corporation of America, 9 a rare
instance where the Eleventh Circuit reversed a lower court's Daubert
ruling.9 0 As the Eleventh Circuit has explained in the past, "a district
court enjoys considerable leeway in making [Daubert] determinations." 1 Because Daubert rulings are an "area where the abuse of
discretion standard thrives," 92 on appeal "it is difficult to persuade a
court of appeals to reverse a district court's judgment on Daubert
grounds."9' 3 But in Adams, the Eleventh Circuit was convinced that the
district court abused its considerable discretion when it excluded the
standard-of-care testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Dorothy
Rosenthal.94
The Adamses sued for professional negligence, alleging that LabCorp's
technicians should have discovered abnormalities in their review of Pap
smear slides. According to the Adamses, LabCorp's negligent review of
the slides led to a delay in the diagnosis of Mrs. Adams's cervical
95
cancer.
To support their allegation that LabCorp's review of the slides fell
below the applicable standard of care, the Adamses presented the
testimony of Dr. Rosenthal, a preeminent expert in the field of examining Pap smear results. Dr. Rosenthal visited LabCorp's facility in
Atlanta and reviewed Mrs. Adams's slides under the same microscope
the LabCorp's technicians had used in their review of the slides. Dr.
Rosenthal performed a so-called non-blinded review of the slides; that is,
she knew that the slides belonged to Mrs. Adams and that Mrs. Adams
was later diagnosed with cervical cancer. During her examination, Dr.
Rosenthal identified abnormalities on several slides that LabCorp's
technicians should have flagged for further review. She thus concluded

88.

Id.

89. 760 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2014).
90. Id. at 1336.
91.

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
92. United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 1264.
94. Adams, 760 F.3d at 1325.
95. Id. at 1324-25.
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that 96LabCorp's examination of the slides fell below the standard of
care.

The district court excluded Dr. Rosenthal's opinion because (1) it was
mere ipse dixit given that Dr. Rosenthal did not perform a blinded
review" of the slides as recommended by the College of American
Pathologists ("CAP") and American Society of Cytopathology ("ASC"); (2)
"the general risk of review bias in non-blinded reviews," (3) Dr.
Rosenthal's "philosophical bent toward patients later diagnosed with
cancer," and (4) Dr. Rosenthal's failure to "adequately simulate a
cytotechnologist's working conditions and circumstances" in her review
of the slides.98
The Eleventh Circuit examined all four of these stated reasons and
found each to be either manifestly erroneous or an error of law.99 First,
the court explained that Dr. Rosenthal's methodology was not a mere
ipse dixit assessment because she used the same system that LabCorp's
technicians use in reviewing slides and then applied her extensive
experience in the relevant field."° The Eleventh Circuit pointed out
that LabCorp's own expert witness employed the same non-blinded
methodology and then challenged Dr. Rosenthal's opinions.1 ' Given
that others were able to challenge Dr. Rosenthal's assessment, the court
disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that Dr. Rosenthal's opinion
was mere ipse dixit. °2
Second, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred as
a matter of law in finding Dr. Rosenthal's methodology unreliable
because she did not follow the CAP's and the ASC's recommendation of
conducting a blinded review when assessing a breach of the standard of
care.103 The Eleventh Circuit vehemently disagreed that industry
groups such as the CAP or the ASC can set guidelines for the admissibilAs the Eleventh Circuit put it,
ity of evidence in federal court.0
courts cannot "delegate to potential defendants decisions about when and

96. Id. at 1325-26.

97. In a blinded review, the slides that are subject to the lawsuit are mixed with slides
from other patients so that the expert does not know which slides belong to the plaintiff

who was later diagnosed with cancer. See id. at 1326 n.6.
98. Id. at 1330-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. at 1327-36.
100. Id. at 1330-31.

A question unresolved by the ruling is whether challenged

testimony can ever be ipse dixit, when the opposing party has its own expert to contest that
testimony.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1330.
103. Id. at 1331.
104. See id. at 1331-34.
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how they may be held civilly liable for their mistakes." 0 5 The court
observed that "this is the first time that an industry group has
promulgated a set of guidelines that attempts to define and limit the
evidence courts should accept when the group's members are sued.""°
Noting that "[t]he members of the CAP and ASC have a substantial
interest in making it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue based on alleged
negligence in their Pap smear screening," the Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court erred in faulting Dr. Rosenthal's methodology for not
following the CAP's and ASC's recommendation of conducting a blinded
review. 107
Third, the Eleventh Circuit held that Dr. Rosenthal's "philosophical
bent toward a plaintiff who has developed cervical cancer" could not
justify excluding Dr. Rosenthal's testimony."° The potential bias of an
expert is a matter for cross-examination. 9 A jury can then determine0
how much weight to give the expert's opinion in light of the bias."
The district court superseded "the jury's factfinding role" when it
excluded the testimony based on Dr. Rosenthal's alleged bias in favor of
the plaintiff."'
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the district court's
reasoning was manifestly erroneous" when it "faulted Dr. Rosenthal's
methodology because her approach did not account for the similar
conditions and surrounding circumstances under which a cytotechnologist works and originally viewed the slides.""' The Eleventh Circuit
noted that the district court overlooked Dr. Rosenthal's significant
experience in this field and her testimony that she considers the working
conditions of the lab technicians when she performs her review." 3
More importantly, an expert need not "stand in the shoes of the
defendant" to testify competently about whether the standard of care
was breached." 4 Under the district court's reasoning, an expert could
not testify as to the standard of care "unless the expert has somehow
recreated the same conditions that the defendant was under.""' The

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
ld. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

1331.
1334 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1335.
1334.
1335 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Eleventh Circuit held that Rule 702 does not impose such a requirement." 6
In Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distributing,LLC,1 7 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the methodologies
employed by the plaintiffs' experts were unreliable. 8 The plaintiff
alleged that her use of Procter & Gamble's ("P&G") zinc-based Fixodent
dental adhesive product caused her to suffer from zinc-induced, copperdeficiency myelopathy ("0DM"). CDM is a neurological condition or
spinal cord disorder that affects the upper and lower extremities. The
district court granted summary judgment to P&G after excluding the
plaintiffs' expert testimony on both general and specific causation." 9
On appeal, the plaintiffs first argued that the district court should not
have conducted a Daubert analysis for the experts' opinions on general
causation-that is, whether the use of Fixodent has the potential to
cause CDM." 0
The plaintiffs contended that general causation
between Fixodent and CDM was not subject to a Daubert inquiry
"because there is a general consensus in the medical community that
ingestion of zinc causes CDM."' 2 ' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed
because the plaintiffs' evidence "fail [ed] to show that the zinc compound
in Fixodent is ...

one of [the] medically accepted, cause-and-effect

toxins, such as asbestos causing asbestosis and cigarette smoking
causing lung cancer and heart disease."'2 2 As such, the district court
correctly performed a full-scale Daubert examination of the methodologies underlying the plaintiffs' experts' opinions on general causation."2
The Eleventh Circuit next reviewed the district court's conclusion that
the plaintiffs' experts failed to employ reliable methodologies to arrive
at their opinions that general causation exists between Fixodent and
CDM. 24 The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling because
the plaintiffs' experts demonstrated a "lack of knowledge of dose26
response, epidemiological evidence, and background risk of disease."
The Eleventh Circuit explained that these methodologies are "indispensable to proving the effect of an ingested substance." 2 ' And "[blecause

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1335-36.
766 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 06, 2015).
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1300-03.
Id. at 1303-04.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1306-08.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
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these experts have failed to demonstrate the primary methods for
proving the zinc in Fixodent causes myelopathy, their secondary
methodologies, including plausible explanations, generalized case
reports, hypotheses, and animal studies are insufficient proof of general
causation."'2 7
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the district court's second
conclusion-that the plaintiffs' only expert to testify on specific causation
failed to apply a reliable methodology to support his opinion.'2 8 The
court explained that [s]pecific causation refers to the issue of whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated that the substance actually caused injury
in her particular case."' 29 The plaintiffs' expert opined that Fixodent
caused the plaintiff's CDM and claimed that he performed a differential
diagnosis to arrive at this opinion. 3 ° While recognizing that differential diagnosis is an accepted methodology, the court held that the
plaintiffs' expert did not follow it.13 ' He "failed to explore fully other

potential causes of [the plaintiff's] CDM," such as "structural spinal cord
injury, multiple sclerosis, and vitamin B12 deficiency. " 32
'
Because
"[an expert's failure to enumerate a comprehensive list of alternative
causes and to eliminate those potential causes determines the admissibility of proposed specific-causation testimony,"'3 3 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the plaintiffs' expert testimony on specific causation.'3
In Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 35 the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed a district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's biomechanical
expert. 3' 6 The plaintiff sued Kia Motors after her daughter was killed
in a car accident that began with a collision between the daughter's Kia
Optima and a Mack truck. 1' According to the plaintiff, the Optima's
engine did not shut off immediately after the impact with the Mack
truck, which caused the Optima to "pinball[] about, colliding with two
parked cars, a fence, a tree, three metal posts supporting a carport
awning, and a flag pole before ultimately coming to rest against a

127. Id.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation makes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1311.
766 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014). The Authors note that their law firm, King &

Spalding, LLP, was counsel for Kia Motors in this case.
136. Id. at 1320.
137. Id. at 1319.
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The plaintiff alleged a design defect theory that "Kia's
house.""
Optima with a fuel shut-off switch led to [her
failure to equip the
139
daughter's] death."
To support this claim, the plaintiff presented the biomechanical
testimony of Dr. Joseph Burton. 4 ° He opined that the Optima's
failure to stop operating in a timely manner "after the initial impact
with the Mack Truck was contributory or causative of [the decedent's]
Dr. Burton offered the opinion that the decedent
brain injuries."'
would not have sustained a fatal brain injury had the Optima stopped
in a timely manner after the initial impact.'42
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of this
opinion.143 Although Dr. Burton claimed that "he reached his conclusion based on the scientific method," he failed to explain "how he tested
his hypothesis to support his conclusions."' 44 While he mentioned two
variables he considered in reaching his opinion, "[hie did not explain how
those two variables were relevant, nor did he explain how he used
[them] to reach his conclusion. "'45 Additionally, Dr. Burton "was
unable to rule out the Mack truck impact as the cause of [the decedent's]
fatal injury" because "he lacked sufficient information about the
Optima's impacts with the [other objects] to48determine whether these
impacts caused or did not cause the injury."
As the Eleventh Circuit explained, "Something doesn't become
scientific knowledge just because it's uttered by a scientist; nor can an
expert's self-serving assertion that his conclusions were derived by the
scientific method be deemed conclusive." 47 In this case, the district
court "reasonably could have questioned the reliability of Burton's
ultimate opinion given the vague manner in which Burton described his
methodology coupled with his inability to express an opinion about how
the various impacts would have affected [the decedent]."' 1 Accordingly, the district court49"did not abuse its discretion by excluding [Dr.]
Burton's testimony."1

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
ld. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1323.

1329.
1329-30.
1330.
1331 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC,5 ° the Eleventh
Circuit also affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the opinion of the
plaintiff's expert was not based on a sufficiently reliable methodology.151 As the anchor tenant in several shopping centers, grocery-store
chain Winn-Dixie sued various other tenants in the same shopping
centers for allegedly breaching restrictive covenants by selling more
groceries than permitted. To prove damages, Winn-Dixie offered the
testimony of Dr. Patricia Pacey, an economist. Dr. Pacey performed a
regression analysis showing the reduction in sales at Winn-Dixie stores
that 2occurred due to the proximity of competitors who also sell grocer15

ies.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of Dr.
Pacey's opinion because the regression model did not account for the
grocery sales permitted by the restrictive covenants. 15 3 The model
showed only how much Winn-Dixie lost in sales due to the presence of
competitors near a store-not how much money Winn-Dixie lost due to
grocery sales in violation of the covenants. Because the model did not
establish causation between a covenant violation and decreased WinnDixie profits, the district court acted within its discretion when it
determined that Dr. Pacey's opinion was not based on a sufficiently
reliable methodology."
As discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit next addressed the district
court's additional conclusion that Dr. Pacey's testimony was inadmissible
because it would not have assisted the trier of fact.'55
The Expert's Testimony Must be Helpful to the Tier of Fact
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Winn-Dixie Stores was the only
published opinion in the 2014 term addressing the last prong of the Rule
702 analysis: whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of
fact. 5' The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that Dr.
157
Pacey's regression model would not have assisted the trier of fact.
The court explained that Rule 702's "helpfulness" prong "goes primarily
C.

to relevance" and "has been aptly described . . .as one of 'fit.'""'

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Put

746 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1016-18.
Id. at 1028.
Id.
Id. at 1028-29.
Id.
Id. at 1029-30.
Id. at 1029 (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 591) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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more succinctly, the "helpfulness standard requires a valid scientific
to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibiliconnection
9
15

ty."

Given that Dr. Pacey's regression model examined only the general
impact of competitors near a Winn-Dixie store, the district court could
well conclude that the model did not "fit" the question the fact-finder
would have to answer in this case: what damages, if any, the defendants
caused Winn-Dixie by selling more groceries than allowed in the
As the Eleventh Circuit explained, 'Dr.
restrictive covenants.6 0
Pacey's analysis employed tools far too blunt to illuminate this
question."' 6 ' Instead of helping the fact-finder, Dr. Pacey's analysis
"could mislead a jury into believing that the data speaks to a causal
162
link."
IV,

NON-CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

A. BalancingRelevance and Unfair Prejudice Under Rules 402 and
403
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, all relevant evidence is typically
6 3
Evidence is relevant where "it has any tendency
admissible at trial."
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
Under Rule 403,165 however, relevant evidence may be
evidence."'
excluded where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by...
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." 66 When
assessing whether the unfair prejudice of evidence substantially

159. Id. (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 591-92) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. at 1029-30.
161. Id. at 1029.
162. Id.
163. FED. R. EVID. 402; see also United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2011).
164. FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
165. FED. R. EVID. 403.
166. Id. Another commonly used evidentiary rule that allows the district court to
exclude relevant evidence is Rule 404(b), which prohibits "[elvidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act... to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character." FED. R. EVID. 404(bX1). While the
Eleventh Circuit did not discuss this rule in any published decisions in the 2014 term, it
did review district courts' application of this rule in a number of unpublished opinions.
See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 553 F. App'x 901 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert.filed
(U.S. Apr. 21, 2014); United States v. Williams, 579 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Gil, 581 F. App'x 766 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Sroufe, 579 F. App'x 974
(11th Cir. 2014).
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outweighs the relevance of that evidence, the trial court must find that
the evidence has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.""6 7 Thus,
Rule 403 requires the court to balance the 68probative value of evidence
against any unfair prejudice it may create.1
This year, the Eleventh Circuit issued two published opinions
considering the balance between the probative value and the unfair
prejudice of potentially relevant evidence.6 9 In Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,170 a widow brought a wrongful death suit against
a tobacco company alleging that her husband contracted lung cancer due
to his addiction to the company's cigarettes. In addition to smoking, the
deceased husband also had a history of alcohol abuse. Before trial, the
court granted the widow's motion to exclude evidence of the husband's
drinking. 17 ' The court excluded evidence of alcohol use as it related
to the husband's cause of death because "'the prejudice [of the evidence]
substantially outweighed the probative value. '" 172 The court did,
however, allow some general testimony of the deceased's alcohol abuse
in the context of compensatory damages because it related to the widow's
relationship with her husband. The jury returned a verdict for the
widow, awarding $5.9 million in compensatory damages and allocating
72.5% of the fault173to the tobacco company and 27.5% of the fault to the
deceased smoker.

The tobacco company appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that
the district court improperly excluded evidence of the deceased's alcohol

167.
168.

FED. R. EVID. 403, advisory comm. note (2014).
Lambert v. Fulton Caty., Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2001); see also

SprintlUnited Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) ("'A district court is
accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal
Rules. Assessing the probative value of [the proffered evidence], and weighing any factors
counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district court's sound judgment
under Rules 401 and 403 ... .'" (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984))
(alteration in original)).

169. See Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2014); Adams
v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014). The court also briefly touched on
Rule 403 in a sex trafficking case, United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.
2014), where the district court admitted evidence of the defendant's internet searches
regarding sex with unconscious women. The defendant, however, failed to properly raise
this issue on appeal. Id. at 1335.
170. 769 F.3d 1063. The Authors note that their law firm, King & Spalding, LLP,
represented R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company in the Aycock case.

171. Id. at 1066, 1067.
172. Id. at 1068 (quoting the trial court).
173. Id. at 1067-68.
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use.1 74 The circuit court began its analysis by stressing that excluding
' 175
and that
evidence under Rule 403 is "'an extraordinary remedy "
176
As such,
"balance should be struck in favor of admissibility."
evidence should only be excluded under Rule 403 where "'unfair
' 1 77
Furthermore,
prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.
while district courts' evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, a circuit court has more freedom to conduct a Rule 403
balancing test in the first instance where the issue arose in an in limine
ruling before trial. 78
Considering the probative value, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
evidence of alcohol abuse was an "essential part" of the tobacco
company's attempt to show that something other than smoking caused
the husband's death.1 79 The exact cause of death was not determined,
and it was possible that alcohol could have been a contributing
factor."s The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court improperly
shifted the burden of proof by requiring the tobacco company to prove
that alcohol was a cause of the decedent's death as a prerequisite to
Under Florida law, the
admitting the evidence of alcohol abuse.'
husband's cigarette use
her
that
of
proving
burden
the
had
plaintiff
"more likely than not caused his death."'82 To rebut this evidence,
however, the tobacco company was not required to prove that another
factor probably caused the husband's death.113 Rather, the district
court should have allowed the company to present evidence of other
possible causes of death to persuade the jury that the husband's smoking
was not the legal cause of harm. 1" 4
Beyond causation, the court also held that the evidence was relevant
to comparative fault.' s5 According to evidence proffered to the district
court, alcohol use makes it less likely that an individual will quit
smoking, and if the jury had known the extent of the deceased husband's

174. Id. Before appealing, the tobacco company moved for a new trial and remittitur
of the compensatory damages. The trial court denied both motions because it found that
it had "'correctly determined that the proffered evidence was inadmissible because the
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value.'" Id.
175. Id. at 1069 (quoting United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983)).
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting King, 713 F.2d at 631).
178. Id. at 1068.
179. Id. at 1070.
180. Id. at 1070-71.
181. Id. at 1070.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1071.
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abuse of alcohol, it may have adjusted the comparative fault ratio more
in favor of the tobacco company." Finally, alcohol abuse was relevant
to the jury's calculation of damages because the deceased husband's
drinking may have harmed the relationship between him and the
plaintiff, resulting in a lower damages award.187 Considering these
factors, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that evidence of alcohol abuse
was crucial to the tobacco company's defense and was therefore highly
probative.'"

Turning to the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence, the court
held that even if the evidence were prejudicial, it was not unfairly
prejudicial considering how relevant it was to the case.8 9 Furthermore, it was questionable whether the evidence was prejudicial at
all.19
The jury was already aware of the husband's alcoholism
because of the limited evidence the trial court did allow in the context
of damages.'' Additionally, the medical report in evidence stated that
he had cirrhosis of the liver, which is typically caused by extended
alcohol abuse. 2 Thus, it was unlikely that additional evidence of
alcohol abuse would have caused appreciable prejudice when presented
in connection with the husband's death.' 93 In the end, the court found
that the district court had abused its discretion by improperly excluding
highly relevant evidence which had little risk of unfair prejudice.'
In Adams v.Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C.,"'9 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the trial court's exclusion of "me too" evidence related to Title VII claims
of a hostile work environment. 196 In Adams, multiple AfricanAmerican employees at a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, filed suit against
their employer for alleged harassment based on their race. Evidence of
the harassment included offensive graffiti in the men's room, racial

186. Id. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found that "[wihen the jury is determining
the comparative fault between the two parties to a tenth of a percentage, there is little
doubt that allowing relevant evidence-namely, alcohol's impact on the development of
lung cancer and its impact on smoking habits and duration-could alter that determination." Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1072.
189. Id.; see also United States v. Cintora-Gonzalez, 569 F. App'x 849, 852 (11th Cir.
2014) ("Although the evidence ...may have proved prejudicial to [the appellant's case],
that is often the case with relevant evidence.").
190. Aycock, 769 F.3d at 1072.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 754 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014).
196. Id. at 1258; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).

20151

EVIDENCE

987

slurs, and the display of nooses and the Confederate flag. A key issue
at trial was the level of racial harassment each individual employeeand the extent each employee was aware of the
plaintiff experienced
197
racial harassment.

During trial, the district court ruled that to support an individual
hostile work environment claim, an employee could not use evidence of
racial harassment of other employees-so called "me too" evidence-that
was not directly connected to the plaintiff-employee's supervisor.
Consequently, the jury found that two of the employees had failed to
show that the workplace was objectively hostile."' 8
On appeal, the two employees argued that the district court erred in
excluding the "me too" evidence. The Eleventh Circuit, however,
affirmed the district court's ruling.'99 The court held that even where
"me too" evidence is relevant, the district court has broad discretion
20°
under Rule 403 to exclude evidence that is prejudicial or misleading.
The court noted that the consideration of "me too" discrimination
evidence by other supervisors is context-specific.2" 1 This case involved
a large company with over 2,000 employees. Therefore, there may have
been considerable variability in employee experience under various
supervisors in other departments. 2 Consequently, the district court
did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 when it excluded evidence
that was unrelated to the plaintiff-employees' superviof discrimination
3
sors.

20

B. Authentication of Recordings Under Rule 901
When the government seeks to introduce an audio or video recording
at trial, the government "has the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to show that a recording is an authentic reproduction of a

197. Adams, 754 F.3d at 1245. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion includes specific
examples of the extremely offensive graffiti which do not bear repeating here. See id. at
1246. Additionally, there was evidence that white supervisors and coworkers referred to
the African-American employees as "boy," "monkey," and "Jeffrey." Id.
198. Id. at 1246-47. To establish a claim of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff
must show that the work environment is both subjectively and objectively hostile. Id. at
1249.
199. Id. at 1257-58.
200. Id. at 1258.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 2008)
(affirming the admission of "me too" evidence to support a hostile work claim against a
small business).
203. Id.
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conversation."" °4 To meet this burden, "the Government ordinarily
must show '(1) the competency of the operator; (2) the fidelity of the
recording equipment; (3) the absence of material deletions, additions, or
alterations in the relevant part of the tape; and (4) the identification of
the relevant speakers."'2 5 The Eleventh Circuit, however, is "'extremely reluctant to disturb the trial court's decision"' to admit a
recording where "'there is independent evidence of the accuracy of the
tape recordings.' 2 ' Additionally, the district court has broad discretion in determining whether a recording should be admitted.0 7
In United States v. Reeves, 05 the Eleventh Circuit considered the
adequacy of the government's authentication of seven recorded telephone
conversations between the defendant and a co-conspirator.20 s At trial,
one defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and, on
appeal, argued that the recordings were not properly authenticated.2 10
The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the district court had not
abused its broad discretion when it admitted the recordings.2" First,
the government had presented testimony from both a co-conspirator and
a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent identifying the defendant's
voice.212
Additionally, the defendant herself provided "sufficient
independent evidence" authenticating the recordings by testifying about

204. United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1092 (11th Cir. 2009); see also FED. R.
EVID. 901(a) ("To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of

evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item
is what the proponent claims it is.").

205. Brown, 587 F.3d at 1092 (quoting United States v. Sarro, 742 F.2d 1286, 1292
(11th Cir. 1984)).
206. Id. (quoting Sarro, 742 F.2d at 1292).
207. United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 766 (11th Cir. 1985).

208. 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014).
209. Id. at 501-02. Reeves also concerned the admission of statements of coconspirators. Id. at 502-03. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2XE), a statement
"made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is not
hearsay and is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 80 1(d(2)E). In Reeves, the Eleventh Circuit held

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a statement that would
otherwise have been considered hearsay because there was sufficient evidence of a
conspiracy to conduct and conceal a cocaine business and that the statement was made in
furtherance of that conspiracy. Reeves, 742 F.3d at 503.
210. Id. at 501.
211. Id. at 502.
212. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 901(bX5) ("The following are examples.., of evidence that
satisfies the [authentication] requirement .. . lain opinion identifying a person's
voice-whether heard fmsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or
recording-based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with
the alleged speaker.").
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authenticatthe conversations.2 13 Thus, the government had properly
2 14
trial.
at
admitted
properly
were
they
and
records,
ed the

213. Reeves, 742 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Id.; see also United States v. Broomfield, 591 F. App'x 847, 851-52 (lth Cir. 2014)
(holding that the government had properly authenticated a video during a firearms
possession trial where it presented evidence that the individual in the video was the
defendant, established where and when the video was made, and identified the specific
firearm and ammunition in the video).

